Taxation--Transfer for Public Religious, and Charitable Uses by Adkins, Fred
CASE COMMENTS
that the agreement did not on its face contemplate the rendition of
legal services by the layman, and by the fact that no legal services
were found to have been rendered by him. The agreement was held
valid despite the fact that their compensation was specified in a lump
sum percentage, because the accountant's portion was for accounting
services rendered. A compelling consideration was the apparent
effectiveness of the attorney-accountant relationship in the tax field.
The court regarded the arrangement as nearly "ideal."
John Ralph Lukens
Taxation-Transfer for Public, Religious, and Charitable Uses
P, the administrator of the deceased's estate, filed for a refund
of estate taxes. The deceased died intestate and without heirs under
the Pennsylvania laws of descent. P contends that the escheating of
property to the state is a transfer by operation of law and that the
estate is entitled to a charitable deduction under ITNT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 2055. The district court denied the deduction. P appealed.
Held, affirmed. The descent of property to a state under its intestacy
laws is not a "transfer" within the meaning of section 2055. There
was absent here the ingredient of a testamentary disposition of the
property. A deduction may be allowed only for "transfers" to public,
charitable, or religious organizations if the transfer is made by
decedent during his lifetime or by will. Senft v. United States, 319
F.2d 642 (3d Cir. 1963).
The instant case raises the question as to what constitutes a
transfer under section 2055. Although this is a case of first im-
pression, the courts in other factual situations have laid down definite
rules for the determination of a charitable deduction. These cases
must be consulted to determine the requisites of a transfer.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides for a deduction
from the gross estate for tax purposes for all bequests, legacies, or
transfers for public, religious, or charitable uses. INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 2055(a). The beginning of section 2055 was the Revenue
Act of 1918, in which the word "gift" was used instead of the word
"transfer." However, in the Revenue Act of 1921, the word "gift"
was changed to "transfer." The purpose of the change was to make
it clear that gifts made during the decedent's lifetime could not be
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deducted as a charitable deduction from the gross estate, unless
these gifts were includible in his gross estate. Therefore, an inter
vivos transfer, under the present law, in order to qualify as a deduc-
tion from the gross estate of the decedent would have to be made
within three years of death. Otherwise the transfer would not be
considered as being made in contemplation of death and would not be
included in decedent's gross estate. LOWNDES & KRAMER, ESTATE AND
GIFT TAXES § 16.6 (2d ed. 1962). In most cases then to assure an
estate of a charitable deduction under section 2055, the transfer
should be testamentary.
In order to have a charitable deduction under section 2055, the
decedent must have had an intent to transfer the property to one of
the named beneficiaries in the section. However, the circuits are
in conflict as to the source from which this intent must be derived.
In Brown v. Comm'r, 50 F.2d 842 (3d Cir. 1931), a bequest was
made to trustees to apply the trust property as they considered best,
keeping in mind the intent of the testator expressed to them from
time to time. The bequest was held deductible. The testator had
expressed to what charities he wanted the property transferred and
these charities qualified under the section in effect at that time. Thus
the testator had made the transfer, because a constructive trust was
created and the trustees were under a legal obligation to transfer
the property to these charities. The result was reached even though
the testator's intent was not expressed in the creating instrument.
However, in Delaney v. Gardner, 204 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1953),
the court denied a deduction where the intent was not expressed
in the creating instrument. The court said that although the four
corners of the will might be abandoned to prevent the executor from
committing a fraud, there was no justification for similar abandon-
ment to effectuate the language and purpose of section 812(d).
INT. REv. CODE of 1939, § 812(d), (Now INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 2055 (a)). The court reasoned that if the intent was not expressed
in the creating instrument, the executor rather than the testator
would be making the transfer.
The use that is to be made of the transferred property must be
designated by the testator if the transferee has other functions than
those named under section 2055. Thus where the testator made a
transfer to a fraternal lodge and did not designate to what use the
property was to be put, the deduction was denied as an incomplete
transfer. Furthermore, the attempted transfer cannot be made into
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a complete transfer by a resolution of the legatee that the property
will be used for charitable purposes so as to exempt the bequest from
tax. There is also a split here among the circuits as to whether the
designation of use must be in the creating instrument or whether the
executor may go outside the creating instrument to determine to
what use the testator intended the property. Levy v. Smith, 103
F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1939).
In certain cases where there is a condition precedent to the transfer
any deduction depends upon the possibility of the contingency
happening and thus allowing the transfer to be effectuated. In
Knoernschild v. Comm'r., 97 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1938), the testator
gave property to his daughter for life, remainder to a religious or-
ganization. The daughter had the power to direct the corpus of the
trust to the support of her mother or brothers in case they were in
need of financial assistance. The deduction was denied. The court
said that in order to be exempt the transfer for public, charitable,
and religious uses, must be final, absolute, unconditional, and irre-
vocable. Even where the amount can be determined but there is a
true contingency before the charity can take, the deduction has been
denied. Thus the contingency that the testator's twenty-seven year
old, divorced, childless daughter must die without issue before the
charity could take, was held too remote and the deduction was
denied. Comm'r v. Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187 (1955). However, a
deduction is allowable if the possibility that the charitable transfer
will not become effective is so remote as to be negligible. Treas.
Reg. § 2055-2(b) (1958). Accordingly, the Internal Revenue
Service has ruled for estate tax purposes that a deduction is allowable
for a bequest to a charity which is contingent upon the failure of
issue of decedent's childless daughters who, at the time of decedent's
death, were both over fifty-four years of age. Rev. Rul. 59-143,
1959-1 CuM. BULL. 247. Farmer's Trust Co. v. United States, 75
F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1935). Thus to be entitled to a charitable deduc-
tion, the amount must be certain and there must not be a true con-
dition precedent.
Where there is a trust arrangement, whether there is a deductible
transfer depends upon the amount of discretionary power that is
vested in the trustee. In Burdick v. Comm'r., 117 F.2d 972 (2d
Cir. 1941), the testator empowered trustees with the discretionary
power of making gifts to charities. The court said that there was
no obligation here for the trustees to transfer the property to charities
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that would qualify under the Act at that time. Also, the fact that
the trustees state that they will give to such charities would not
make the transfer good. The trustees rather than the testator would
be making the transfer. If, however, the discretion of the trustee is
limited to charities mentioned in the section and is not purely dis-
cretionary, the transfer is considered to have been made by the
testator, and his estate is entitled to a deduction. Charitable Corp. v.
United States, 170 F. Supp. 239 (N.D.N.Y. 1958); Beggs v. United
States, 27 F. Supp. 599 (Ct. Cl. 1939). Also, under a prior section
of the Code the Court in Taft v. Comm'r., 304 U.S. 351 (1938),
held that where the testator made a pledge to a charity during his
lifetime which was later paid by his executor, the estate was not
entifled to a charitable deduction. The Court reasoned that the
executor rather than the testator would be making the transfer.
Since this decision, the Code has been amended to allow a deduction
in the above situation. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2053(c) (1) (A).
This section operates on the theory that the pledge to charity is a
claim against the estate, instead of a deductible transfer to charity
by the testator. However, under the above section, the claim must
be enforceable under local law as a claim against the estate before
the deduction is allowed. LOWNDES & KRAMER, op. cit. supra, § 16.6.
The cases as set forth in this comment lay down certain requisites
for a transfer. These are: (1) the transfer must be made testa-
mentary or inter vivos by the testator, (2) the testator must have
had intent to transfer to one of the named organizations under sec-
tion 2055, (3) the use to be made of the property transferred must
be designated by the testator if the charity has functions other than
those listed under section 2055, (4) the amount must be certain or
be capable of being made certain and without a true condition
precedent, and (5) if there is a trust arrangement, the trustee must
not have discretionary power to give to charities other than those
listed under section 2055.
Applying these requisites to the facts of the instant case, the court's
decision is in line with the prior holdings on what constitutes a
transfer. The intestate in the instant case could not meet any of
the requirements of a transfer. The fact that the property ultimately
ended in the possession of one of the named organizations under
section 2055 would not be sufficient for a deduction. The courts
have long held that estate tax deductions are matters of legislative
grace and that all statutory requirements must be met before a
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deduction is allowable. The rule that taxing statutes must be con-
strued in favor of the taxpayer does not apply where deductions are
concerned. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917); Sheed v. Comm'r.,
237 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1956).
Fred Adkins
Unfair Competition-Infringement of a Trade Name
Polaroid Corporation, plaintiff, brought this action against Polaraid,
Inc., defendant, for injunctive and other relief based upon the use
by D of P's corporate name or a colorable imitation thereof in con-
nection with D's business operation. P sought relief in a three-
count complaint. The first count charged that the D infringed upon
the registered trade-mark, "Polaroid," of the P. The second count
charged the D with unfair competition in appropriating and using
as its trade name and trademark, "Polaraid," which is substantially
identical and confusingly similar to P's trade name and trademark.
The third count charged the D with violation of the Illinois Anti-
dilution Statute. ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 140, § 22 (1959). The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois rendered
judgment for the D. P appealed. Held, reversed. Injunctive relief
was granted even if no competition existed between the parties be-
cause the resemblance of the different trade names was so close
that it would likely produce confusion. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid,
Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963).
The principal case raises the question of what must be shown to
entitle a party to injunctive relief for unfair competition. In refer-
ence to unfair competition, courts in the past have handed down
different tests to follow in determining if an injunction should be
granted.
Once the rule on trademarks took shape, business pirates thought
of new ways to take advantage of another's good-will. Equity at-
tempted to protect the honest businessmen by developing the law of
unfair competition. At the beginning the courts found it extremely
difficult to find unfair competition between the parties where there
was no competition because most of the precedents involved a busi-
ness "passing off" their goods as belonging to another and "passing
off" explained and determined most of the cases. Hence, courts
began to apply the prosposition that there could be no unfair com-
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